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ABROAD IN THE LAND: LEGAL
STRATEGIES TO EFFECTUATE THE
RIGHTS OF THE PHYSICALLY DISABLED
"Movement, we are told, is a law of animal life. As to man,
in any event, nothing could be more essential to personality,
social existence, economic opportunity-in short, to individual
well-being and integrntion into the life of the connnunity-than
the physical capacity, the public approval, and the legal right to
to be abroad in the land." 1

The past decade has witnessed a growing public awareness of the
rights of many disadvantaged and previously ignored groups in society.
Essentially unnoticed, however, are the problems of the physically
di~abled.~
Discrimination against the handicapped exists in many forms.
For instance, entire school systems flagrantly violate state law by excluding handicapped children;" planners design public buildings which
and employers, fearful of
are inaccessible to the physically di~abled;~
higher insurance costs, refuse to hire them? While the ensuing economic
costs are serious, the human costs, in terms of the suffering and wasted
lives, are even more distressing.
1 Jacobus tenBroek, The Right to Live in the World: The Disabled in the Law of
L. REV.841 (1966) (Professor tenBroek himself was blind).
Torts, 54 CALIF.
2The total number o£ physically handicapped individuals in the United States is not
readily ascertainable. One authority recently placed the number at 11.7 million. See
Hearings on H.R. 8395 Before the S u b c m . on the Handicapped of the Senate C m .
on Labor and Public Welfare, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 265 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
Handicapped Hearing.-Senate]. The difficulty in obtaining accurate and meaningful
statistics is attributable to the inability of statisticians to measure the effect of a defined
handicap on the capacity of the handicapped to function normally in society. For ex,ample, the epileptic may not be handicapped in his capacity to use public transportation; however, he is severely limited in his ability to secure and maintain employment.
See M. Gandy, Notes on Employment Problems and Epilepsy Patients, Jan. 4, 1971
(available from Epilepsy Foundation of America). Similarly, an individual with a
spinal cord injury may be able to obtain employment but incapable of utilizing public
transportation in order to seek and maintain employment. See Handicapped HearingsSenate 1006. Numerical statistics must be evaluated in terms of the resultant effect of a
specific disability on participation in normal activity. See generally U.S. S o m
SECURITY
~ M I N . ,DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC.,& WELFARE,
SOCIAL
SECURITY
SURVEYOF THE
DISABLED:
1966 (Rpt. No. 10, 1970); U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH,EDUC.,& WELFARE,
CHRONIC
C o m r n o ~ sAND L I M ~ ~ A ~OF
OA
N Sm n ANXI M o s n i n (National Health Survey Series
10, No. 61, 1971); U.S. HEALTHSERVICES
Qr MENTALHEALTH
ADMIN.,DEP'T OF HEALTH,
EDUC.,& WELFARE,
USEOF SPECIALArrs, (National Health Survey Series 10, No. 78,
Public Health Service Pub. No. (HSM) 73-1504).
sSee 118 GNG.
REC.1258 (1972) (remarks of Representative Vanik).
.4See Washiigton Post, Dec. 8, 1972, § D, at 3, col. 1.
' 5 See M. Gandy, nrpsa note 2, at 8.
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While a number of laws have been enacted which affect the handicappedBit is only recently that the handicapped themselves vocally
have asserted their right to equal treatment.7 Proposed amendments to
Title VIs and Title VI19 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 would have
prohibited discrimination against the handicapped in federal programs
and in private employment. Although there was strong support for
these bills among the handicapped, no action was talcen. A similar
provision to prohibit discrimination in federal programs was included
in the Rehabilitation Act of 19721° which was passed by Congress but
subsequently vetoed by the President.ll
In view of this limited legislative action, the handicapped may be
forced to resort to the courts in order to vindicate their rights. T o do
6Most of these laws do not secure the civil rights of the handicapped, but rather
provide services and assistance. 29 U.S.C. §§ 31-42b (1970) (vocational rehabilitation
for persons injured in industry); Developmental Disabilities Services and Facilities Construction Amendments of 1970, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2661-66, 2670-77c (1970). See generally
US. DEP'T OF HEALTH)EDUC.& WELFARE, SUMMARYOB SELECI-ED
LEGISLATION
RELATINO
TO THE HANDICAPPED
(1971). However, three recently enacted federal laws protect some
aspects of a handicapped person's civil rights. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4151-56 (1970) (prohibits architectural barriers in newly constructed and renovated federal buildings); Act
of Oct. 21, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-515, 86 Stat. 970 (protects civil rights of the blind and
the otherwise physically disabled in the District of Columbia; requires equal access t o
public places, public accommodations and conveyances; prohibits discrimination in employment; and guarantees equal access to housing); Education Amendments of 1972,
Pub. L. No. 92-318, § 903, 86 Stat. 235 (prohibits discrimination against the blind in
federally funded educational programs).
Several states have gone further than the federal government in securing the rights of
the disabled. The Illinois constitution guarantees the physically and mentally handicapped the fullest possible participation in the social and economic life of the state.
ILL. CONST.art. I, 5 19. Other states have anti-discrimination laws protecting handicapped persons seeking employment in private industry. See IOWACODEANN. 4 601A.7
(Supp. 1972); WIS.STAT.§ 111.31 (1969). In addition, many state constitutions provide
for education as a basic right. See F. WEINTRAUB)A. ABESONAND D. BRADDOCK)
STATE
LAWSON EDUCATIONO F HANDICAPPED CHILDREN;
ISSUESAND RECOMMENDATIONS11 (1971).
But see id. at 11-12, 17 (some state constitutions permit omission from mandatory attendance laws of children with certain handicaps); notes 14-16 infra and accompanying
text. A number of state statutes provide that publicly funded buildings must be accessible t o handicapped persons, and some statutes include publicly used-privately owned
buildings as well. See COMMITTEE
ON BARRIER
FREEDESIGN)THEPRESIDENT'S
COIMMITIW
ON EMPLOYMENT
OF THE HANDICAPPED,
A SURVEYOF STATELEGISLATIONm REMOYI.
A R ~ C T U R BARRIERS.
AL
See also note 59 infra.
TThoben, Disabled People March for Civil Rights, U.S. DEP'T. OF HEALTH,EDUC.
&
WELFARE)
~ I L I T A T I O RECORD,
N
Sep. & Oct., 1972, at 24.
8 H.R. .12,154, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
9 H.R. 10,962,92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1972).
1 0 H.R. 8395,92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
1lWeekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Oct. 30, 1972. The same provision was contained in a revised version of the Act passed by the 93d Congress. S. 7,
93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). It again was vetoed by the President. Weekly Compiladon of Presidential Documents, Apr. 2, 1973. An attempt to override this veto failed.
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so, they must develop new legal strategies by using existing theories in
previously unexplored ways. This Note will consider the development
of such strategies in the areas of education, physical access and
employment.
Sixty percent of the estimated seven million handicapped children
in the United States are denied the special educational assistance they
need for full equality of opportunity.12 One million are excluded
entirely from public school systems.13 The bases for this discrimination
lie in constitutional provisions,14 statutes15 and court decisions16 of the
various states. Two recent district court opinions, however, recognized the right of the handicapped to participate equally in public
education. A consent decree issued in Pennsylvania Association Fm
Retarded Child~env. P m n ~ y l v a n i 2required
~
the state to provide free
access to public education and training for all mentally retarded children.18 The court in Mills v. Board of EdacationlS stated that the
education right extended to the physically handicapped as well as to
the mentally retarded.20 The Mills court held that the denial of a publicly supported education for the handicapped in the District of Columbia, where public education was available to all others, violated the
due process clause of the fifth amendment.21 The same rationale may
be applicable to the states through the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth
12118 CONG.REC. S7852 (daily ed. May 16, 1972) (remarks of Senator Williams).
18 Id.

l4See DEL. CONS. art. 10, § 1; N.M. CONST.art. 12, § 5. Both the New Mexico and
Delaware constitutions permit omission of the mentally and physically handicapped from
the state's compulsory school attendance provisions.
1sSee ALASKA
STAT.§ 14.30.010(b) (3) (1962); NEV. REV. STAT.5 392.050 (1971).
l6The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that a board of education may deprive a
physically handicapped child of his right to a public school education. See State ex rel.
Beattee v. Board of Educ., 169 Wis. 231, 23435, 172 N.W. 153, 155 (1919). However,
in 1967 the Wisconsin Attorney General, while reafkning the right of. local school
authorities to exclude a student, stated that other means for a free, public education
m p a note 6, at 12.
must be provided. See F. WEINTRAUB,A. ABFSON AND D. BRADDOCK,
Thousands of handicapped children still are excluded from Wisconsin public schools.
See 118 CONG.REC. E561 (1972) (remarks of Representative Vanik).
17 334 F. Supp. 1257 (ED. Pa. 1971).
18 Id. at 1259.
19 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).
20 Id. at 878.
21 Id. at 875.
=The fifth amendment, which contains a due process clause, is applicable to the
District of Columbia, while the fourteenth amendment, which contains both a due
process clause and equal protection clause, applies only to the states. See Bolling v.
Sharpe, 347 US. 497,499 (1954). Though both concepts stem from the American ideal
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The Supreme Court has applied avo tests for judging whether a
state's justification defeats an equal protection challenge. Under the
more lenient rational basis test, a state's classification is unconstitutional
only if based on grounds totally irrelevant to the state's 0bjective.2~
However, when fundamental interests24or suspect classificationszGare
involved, the Court scrutinizes discriminatory laws more carefully
and requires the state to demonstrate an interest sufficiently compelling
to overcome a presumption of in~alidity.2~
Discrimination against the handicapped may be a suspect classification. The courts have found suspect classifications when the particular
group involved is saddled with such disabilities, subjected to a history
of such purposeful discrimination, or relegated to a position of such
The
~ stigma of
political weakness as to require special p r ~ t e c t i o n . ~
inferiority usually attached to such a classification has been the major
Handidetermining factor in designating classifications as
capped groups historically have been politically weak and fragmented?O
of fairness, they are not mutually exclusive. While the equal protection clause is 3
more explicit safeguard against prohibited unfairness than the due process clause, every
interest found to be fundamental and protected under due process probably is fundamental under the equal protection clause as well. See Developments in the Lm-Eqrutl
Protection, 82 HARV.
L. REV.1065, 1130 (1969). Thus the Mills court's rationale based
on the due process clause in the District of Columbia is sound precedent for application
of the equal protection clause t o the states.
23See, e.g, Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-76 (1971); Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457,
463-64 (1957); Lindsey v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911); see notes
129-130 infrn and accompanying text.
24Fundamental interests include travel, voting, criminal procedure, marriage and procreation. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969) (travel); Reynolds v.
Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964) (voting); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357
(1963) (criminal procedure); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535,
541 (1942) (marriage and procreation).
26 Suspect c1.assifications are those classifications based on alienage, race and national
ancestry. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371 (1971) (alienage); Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9 (1967) (race); Koremam v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216
(1944) (national ancestry).
26See, e.g, Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 US. 330, 339 (1972); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191-92 (1964).
The presence of a fundamental interest or a suspect classification is sufficient to trigger
the compelling state interest test. See, e.g, Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72
(1971); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1,
11 (1967); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
27 See San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 41 U.S.L.W. 4407, 4415
(US. Mar. 21,1973).
ZsSee, e.g, Loving v. Virginia, 388 US. 1, 7 (1967) (racial classification); Brown v.
Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (racial classification); ICorematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214, 239 (1944) (Murphy, J., dissenting) (national ancestry classification). See generally Comment, T h e Evolution of Eqml Protection-Edzrcntion, Mfmicipal Services and Wealth, 7 HARV.
CIV. RIGHTS-CIV.
LIB. L. REV. 103, 132-35 (1972).
29 See Handicapped Hem*ngsSennte 564-67.
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and handicapped persons have been stigmatized by society with a badge
of inferiorieO The handicapped condition, often congenital and-unalterable, has been analogized to racial cla~sifications~~
which almost
always compel the strict standard of re~iew.3~
classification of the
handicapped, involving a politically weak group with a congenital or
unalterable trait, similarly should undergo the strictest scrutiny by the
courts.
The alternative method to invoke the application of the compelling
state interest test is to recognize education as a fundamental intere~t.3~
The Supreme Court, however, in San Antonio Independent. School District Y.-~odriguez;4 sustained Texas' use of the p r o p e q tax as the
means for financing public education, while holding that education
is not a fundamental interest.35 The Court, nevertheless, left open a door
to a constitutional attack on unequal educational opportunity when
this inequality consists of an absolute denial of education.3c Such an
absolute-denial of education is what confronts many handicapped chil30Kriege1, Uncle Tom and Tiny Tim: Some RefIections on the Cripple as Negro,
38 AMERICAN
SCHOLAR
412 (1969). But see Developments in the Law, m p a note 22, at
1127 (stigma of inferiority does not attach t o certain physical disabilities as it does to
recognized suspect classifications).
31 Kriegel, ncpra note 30, at 416.
8aThe Supreme Court struck down a racial classification involving segregation in the
public schools. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Per curiarn decisions
issued by the Court subsequent to Brown dealing with other public facilities such as
parks, bathhouses and golf courses indicate that all racial classifications are viewed with
strictest scrutiny. See, e.g, New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass'n v. Detiege, 358
U.S. 54 (19581, a r g ivzenz. 252 F.2d 122 (5th Cir.); Mayor & City Council v. Dawson, 350
U.S. 877 (1955), afg menz. 220 F.2d 386 (4th Cir.); Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical
Ass'n, 347 U.S. 971 (1954), vacating 7izenz. 202 F.2d 275 (6th Cir. 1953). Subsequent
decisions have applied the same suict standard. See, e.g, Swann v. Board of Educ., 402
U.S. 1 (1971); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S.
184 (1964).
33See, e.g, Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent School Dist., 337 F; Supp. 280,
283 (W.D. Tex. 1971), rev'd, 41 U.SL.W. 4401 (U.S. Mar. 21, 1973); Van Dursatz v.
Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870, 874-75 (D. ~Minn.1971); Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584,
604-10, 487 P.2d 1241, 1255-59, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 615-619 (1971).
34 41 U.SL.W. 4401 (U.S. Mar. 21, 1973).
35 Id. at 4417.
30 Whatever merit appellees' argument might have if a State's financing system
occasioned an absolute denial of educational opportunities t o any of its
children, that argument provides no basis for finding an interference with
fundamental rights where only relative differences in spending levers are
involved and where-as is true in the present 'case-no charge fairly could
be made that the system fails t o provide each child with an opportunity to
acquire the basic and minimal skills necessary for the enjoyment of the ,
rights of speech and of full participation in the political process.
Id. at 4418.
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~ l r e n .Hence
~ ~ the holding of Mills zr. Board of Eclzt~ation,8~
that the
right to a free, publicly supported education extends to all handicapped
children,s9 should not be placed in jeopardy by the Rodriguez decision.
In situations where there is no absolute denial of education to the handicapped, but merely the allegation that the education provided by the
state is inadequate, the Rodriguez decision will l i t plaintiff's attempts
to obtain the strict scrutiny of suspect classification analysis.
If successful in establishing the handicapped condition as a suspect
classification, traditional arguments offered as justifications by the stare
probably would not pass the compelling interest test. Whiie a state
might argue that prohibitive costs compel such classification, the Supreme Court has stated previously that constitutional rights cannot be
denied merely because their protection will necessitate the expenditure
~
administrative inconvenience is not a comof public f ~ n d s . 4Similarly
pelling interest justifying the exclusion of the physically disabledF1
School systems which discriminate against or totally exclude handicapped
children then would have to provide the equal educational opportunities to which all children are entitled.&

TRANSPORTATION

The two major barriers to complete utilization of transportation
facilities by the physically handicapped are architectural design and
legal recognition of the rights of the handicapped. Architectural impediments are particularly acute for individuals confined to wheelchairs
who are often unable to enter buses, trains, planes, or transportation
ter1ninals.4~Since these physical obstacles can be eliminated effectively
the only remaining
by modern technology and proper ~lanning,4~
barrier to sufficient mobility is the lack of legal principles implementing
Even where that right clearly is
the right to fully use such fa~ilities.~~
37 See notes

13-16 supra and accompanying text.
38348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972); see notes 19-22 m#ra and accompanying text.
39 348 F. Supp. at 875.
4oSee, e.g, Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376 (1971); Boddie v. Connecticut,
401 US. 371, 382 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 265-66 (1970).
41 Cf. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 US. 371, 381 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254,265-66 (1970).
42See F. W E I ~ UA.
B ABESON
,
AND D. BRADDOCK,
supra note 6, at 40-46.
43See Mandella & Schlveikert, Mobility for Physicnlly Ilmpaired Persons, 25 PARAPLEGIA NEWS,NOV.1972, at 14.
44 Id. at 15-16. For example, California's Bay Area Rapid Transit System was designed
to be totally accessible to disabled persons. Id.
45Some attempts have been and are being made. The Civil Aeronautics Board has
notified air carriers of its intention to exercise rule-making authority with regard t o
the transportation of physically disabled persons. See 36 Fed. Reg. 20,309 (1971). The
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established by legi~lation,4~
some officials have failed to initiate effective
action.47 Thus, the courts again may be called upon to provide relief
where legislation is either non-existent or not fully implemented by
public officials.
The Supreme Court has developed the principle that the right to
interstate travel and the right to use the instrumentalities of interstate
commerce are fundamental under the Constituti~n.~~
In Shapiro v.
Thomp~on,4~
the Court declared that statutes requiring residence as a
prerequisite for the receipt of welfare benefits infringe upon the constitutional right to travel by inhibiting movement from one state to
another.60 The Court reasoned that residency requirements create two
move is in reaction to present dissatisfaction with a 1962 industry agreement. See CAB
Agreement No. 16614 (Dec. 31, 1962). See generally Medical Criteria for Passenger
Flying, AR-s
OF ENVIRONME~AL
HEALTH,
Feb., 1961. The new rules have not been
promulgated.
The Interstate Commerce Commission has not regulated the transportation of handicapped persons via rail or interstate bus. See H d c a p p e d HearingsSenme 515. However, the National Railroad Passenger Corporation (AMTRACK) has provided barrier-free construction in new equipment and facilities and renovation of old equipment
and facilities where practical and feasible. National Railroad Passenger Corp. Ekecutive
Memorandum No. 72-4 (Mar. 15, 1972).
40See 42 U.S.C. 5 4151 (1970) (requiring that buildings financed with federal funds be
designed and constructed to be accessible to the physically handicapped). The statute
was amended in 1970 to include the Washington, D.C., subway system, presently under
construction. See Act of Mar. 5, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-205, 84 Stat. 49 mending 42
U.S.C. 5 4151 (1970).
47 Washington, D.C., subway officials refused to approve installation of elevators in
the local system, as mandated by Congress, until ordered by the court to do so. See
Washington Urban League, Inc. v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority,
Inc., Civil No. 776-72 (D.D.C., June 29, 1973). The suit focused on the need for further appropriating legislation rather than individual rights.
4BSee United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757 (1966). The right was first d c u lated by Chief Justice Taney in the Passenger Cases, a series of cases concerning the
right of the states to impose a tax on aliens. Passenger Cases, 48 US. (7 How.) 282,
463 (1849) (Taney, C.J., dissenting). Eighteen years later a majority of the Court
adopted Taney's earlier views that the right to travel is an incident of national citizenship. Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35,49 (1867).
49 394 US. 618 (1969).
6oZd. at 629. Pennsylvania, Connecticut and the District of Columbia had statutory
provisions denying welfare assistance to individuals who had not resided in the particular jurisdiction for at least one year. Id. at 622-27. See also Dunn v. Blumstein, 405
U.S. 330 (1972) (durational residency requirement as prerequisite for voting violative
of fundamental right to travel calling for application of compelling state interest test).
Whereas both Guest and Shapiro only involved the right to travel interstate, lower
courts have found a fundamental right to travel intrastate. See King v. New Rochelle
Municipal Housing Authority, 442 F.2d 646, 648 (2d Cir.), c m . denied, 404 U.S. 863
(1971); Cole v. Housing Authority, 435 F2d 807, 809 (1st Cir. 1970); Valenciano v.
Bateman, 323 F. Supp. 600, 603 (D. Ariz. 1971). The Supreme Court has never addressed the question of purely intrastate travel. The majority in Shapiro did not ascribe
the right to travel to any particular constitutional provision but rather to the general
constitutional concepts of personal liberty. 394 US. at 629. In dissent, Chief Justice
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classes of potential welfare recipients-those living within the state for
the prescribed period and those living within the state for less than
the prescribed period;G1 Applying the compelling state interest test, the
Court concluded that a classification which infringes the fundamental
right to travel violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment."2
Similarly, all travelers might be classified into two groups-the physically handicapped, who have restricted access to the instrumentalities
of interstate travel, and the non-handicapped, who have complete access.
Since these discriminatory restrictions constitute an infringement on the
right to travel, transportation companies should be required to demonstrate that a compelling state interest justifies the exclusion of the
handicapped. Of course, some governmental action must be shown
as a prerequisite for application of either the due process or the equal
protection clauses.5g Publicly owned transportation companies, and
even certain privately owned companiesp4 would satisfy the "state
action" requirement.
Warren and Justice Black looked to the commerce clause for the origins of the right.
See id. at 644, 648 (Warren, C.J., Sr Black, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan, in dissent,
concluded that the right has its source in the due process clause of the fifth amendment. Id. at 655, 671 (Harlan, J., dissenting). The Court has also found a close relationship between the freedom to travel and the fieedoms of speech and association.
See Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 517 (1964). Under the view that the
right to travel stems from the commerce clause, it probably would not apply t o purely
intrastate transportation. But, if the right derives from the freedoms of speech and
association, it would be diicult t o deny its application t o intrastate travel. See Note,
Residence Requirements After Shapiro v. T h m p s o n , 70 COLUM.L. REV.134, 138 (1970).
5 1 394 US. at 627.
62 Id. at 638. T h e Court further held that the District of Columbia's residence requirements for welfare benefits violated the due process clause of, the fifth amendment.
Id. at 64142. See generally 1 C. A m m ~ u MODERN
,
C O N ~ T U ~ O NLAW
A L § 8.94 (1969).
The equal protection clause does not apply to the District of Columbia. See note 22
supza.
- 53For a court t o find that a transportation system is in violation of equal protection,
state action must be shown. U.S. CONST.amend. XIV, § 1. Governmental action is also
necessary for application of fifth amendment due process. See Public Utilities Comm'n.
v. Pollack, 343 US. 451,461 (1952); Corrigan v. Buckely, 271 U.S. 323, 330 (1926). The
operation of a transportation company regulated under the authority of Congress constitutes governmental action. See Public Utilities Comm'n. v. Pollack, s z p at 461-62.
54A privately owned municipal transit system can be so enfranchised that it is state
action for the company to engage in conduct violative of equal protection. See Boman
v. Birmingham Transit Co., 280 F2d 531 (5th Cir. 1960); Williams, T h e Tw'light of
State Action, 41 TEXAS
L. REV. 347, 358-59 (1963). The courts have found state action
in various other instances. See, e.g., Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966) (private
organization carrying out a public function); Burton v. Wilmington Parldng Authority,
365 U.S. 715 (1961) (private business an integral part of a public building devoted to a
public service); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 US. 1 (1948) (judicial enforcement of a
private agreement). But see Moose Lodge 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972) (mere
licensing does not constitute state action).
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The cost of solving current architectural problems through existing
technology should not be a sufficiently compelling interest to justify
the denial of a fundamental constitutional right such as travelF5 Therefore, courts may be asked to require publicly owned and some privately
owned transportation systems to spend the funds necessary to make
their facilities accessible to the physically handicapped.
PUBLIC BUILDINGS

The handicapped presently are excluded from many public buildings by architectural barriers ranging from monumental staircases to
six-inch
Although federal law requires that all new federal
and federally assisted facilities designed for public use be readily accessible," there is no provision for existing structuresF8 State statutes
addressing the problem of architectural barriers also generally ignore
the need for modifications of existing buildings." These buildings
house a wide range of federal and state agencies and services to which
the public must have access; the efforts of the handicapped individual
to secure assistance and present grievances and complaints are impeded
by his inability to gain physical access to the buildings. 'If this interference infringes the handicapped person's constitutional rights, removal of the interference may be forced by court action.
GSSee, e.g, Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376 (1971); Boddie v. Connecticut,
401 U.S. 371, 382 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 255-56 (1970).
5uSee Martin, A Wheelchair View, Washington Post, Dec. 8, 1972, 5 D, at 5, col. 1;
Martin, W h e n 'Up' is n D o q Washington Post, Oct. 29, 1972, 4 K, at 1, col. 1; Martin,
Hmulicaps on the Hill, Washington Post, Oct. 1, 1972, 4 L, at 1, col. 8.
57See 42 U.S.C. 45 4151-56 (1970). Primary responsibility for developing standards is
lodged with the Administrator of General Services who must consult with the Secretary
of Health, Education, and Welfare. Id. § 4152 (1970). Regulations passed pursuant t o
the legislation have incorporated detailed accessibility standards adopted by the American National Standards Institute. Federal Property Management Regulations, 41 C.F.R.
§ 101-17.703 (1972) ;see AMERICAN
NATIONAL
STAAWARDS
INSTITUTE, AMERICAN
STANDARD
SPECIFICATIONS
FOR MAKING
BUILDINGS
AND FACIL~ES
ACCESSTSLE
TO AND USABLE
BY THE
PHY~ICALLY
HANDICAPPED,
USAS A117.1 (1961). The ANSI standards include ramp
gradients, water fountain heights, and door and toilet stall widths. Id. 5 5.
58 Only existing structures which are altered for federal use or with federal funds are
included in the legislation. See 42 U.S.C. § 4151 (1970).
50 See COMMIZTEE
ON BARRIER
FREEDESIGN,
supra note 7. Some of the statutes provide
that accessibility is required only if economically feasible and not unreasonably complicated. Others require that the building have one entrance which is accessible while
ignoring other barriers. See id. Four states have laws covering publicly used, privately
owned buildings; fourteen explicitly cover remodeling. See id. Like the federal government, most states have no provision for existing structures. One county in Ohio did
consent to erect an elevator in the existing county courthouse after suit by* a local
resident. Consent Decree, Wargowsky v. Novak, Civil No. C-72-138 (N.D. Ohio, March
30, 1973). Another county in Ohio consented to remove barriers from its court houses
and the health and welfare building. Friedman v. County of Cuyahoga, Case No.
895961 (Cuyahoga County Ct. 1972).
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The Supreme Court long has recognized that citizens have the right
to come to their "seats of government" to transact business and petition for redress of grievance^.^^ This freedom to petition is protected
by the first amendmentm and applies to all branches of government, including the administrative agen~ies.0~
The judiciary has been vigilant to
prohibit infringement upon the citizen's right to communicate freely
with the government. In Brown v. L o ~ i s i a mthe
~ Supreme Court upheld the right of the citizen to be physically present in a public building to petition for redress of a grievance related to the operation of
60The seat o i government is where the courts, executive and legislature are located.
Cf. Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 US. 229,235 n.10 (1963).
8lSee Gandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 44 (1867); Passenger Cases, 48 US.
(7 How.) 282, 491 (1849) (Taney, C.J., dissenting). Although courts recognize the
extreme importance of the right to petition, it has received much less attention than
the rights of speech and assembly. Thii may be due t o the fact that it is closely intertwined with the latter rights. See United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389
U.S. 217, 222 (1967) (speech, assembly and petition intimately connected and equally
fundamental). See also De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937) (right to petition
an integral part of republican form of government).
62U.S. Co~sr.amend. I. The first amendment's prohibition of acts by Congress
abridging the right to petition has been extended to the states through the fourteenth
amendment. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 US. 296, 303 (1940); Schneider v. State, 308
US. 147, 160 (1939); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 656 (1925). Section 1983 of title
42 of the United States Code prohibits state violations of, rights protected by the fourteenth amendment and can serve as a basis for suit against the state. See Wilwording
v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249 (1971) ;Hatfield v. Bailleaux, 290 F2d 632, 636 (9th Cir. 1961) ;
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). See also Chambers v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 207 U.S. 142, 148
(1907) (right to sue and defend is privilege under article IV of the Constitution; right
conservative of all other rights).
63See California Motor Trans. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972),
Although access to the courts is protected by the first amendment, when the state
denies a party use of the courts or refuses a remedy, due process may be violated. While
a state may regulate the manner in which its courts operate, due process is denied if its
conditions are unreasonable. See Cohen v. Beneficial Finance, 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
See also Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (garnishment without
opportunity t o defend). Such due process requirements extend to administrative actions
as well. See Bell v. Burson, 402 US. 535 (1971) (license revocation by Bureau of Motor
Vehicles); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (no evidentiary hearing prior to
termination of welfare benefits).
In a recent case the appellants argued that the imposition of filing fees on indigents
in divorce actions violated their first amendment right t o petition. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971). The Court, however, viewed access to the courts as an
element of due process in this instance because the judicial process was the only means
available for dissolving the marriage. Id. at 375. W h y the Court chose due process is
not clear since issues such as service of process would not have been necessary to
resolve had they relied on the first amendment. See La France, Constitzrtionnl Lnw
Refam for the Poor: Boddie v. Connecticut, 1971 DUKEL.J. 487, 529 (the author was
counsel for appellants).
84 383 US. 131 (1966).
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that facility.c5 Moreover, in Edwards v. South CarolindB the Court
viewed the defendants' efforts to enter the state house grounds, a public
facility, to present their grievances as an exercise of first amendment
rights in its most "pristine and classic form." 67 Thus, while public
agencies have the right to regulate access to their fa~ilities:~they may
not do so in an unreasonable and discriminatory manner.69 Since the
physical barriers which impede the handicapped individual's access generally exist because of poor planning choices and serve no useful purpose, they may be attacked as unreasonable and discriminatory. The
possibility of alternative means of communication is irrelevant. The
defendants in Brown and Edwards had other means of communication, but the Court nevertheless found the restrictions on defendants'
access to be an unjustifiable burden on their first amendment rightsyo
Since the right to petition is protected by the first amendment it may
only be infringed when a danger exists to interests which the state
lawfully may pr0tect.7~The state clearly has infringed the rights of the
handicapped since, although it did not create their physical condition,
by constructing physical barriers it created their excl~sion.'~ The state
had the alternative when building its facilities to use designs which
would have made them fully accessible at similar costJ3 By an official
65 Id.

at 142.
372 U.S. 229 (1963).
07Id. at 235.
6s See Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131,143 (1966).
69 Id. Discriminatory regulations infringing first amendment rights are prohibited even
for restricted areas such as military bases. See Flower v. United States, 407 U.S. 197
(1972) (leaflemng permitted on "public street" within military base); cf. Downing v.
Kunzig, 454 F2d 1230 (6th Cir. 1972) (public normally has access when conducting own
business). But see Barrett v. Kunzig, 331 F. Supp. 266 (1971), u f d , 41 U.S.L.W. 3128
(6th Ci.Feb. 22,1972), cert. denied, 409 US. 914 (1972).
70See Brown v. Louisiana, 383 US. 131 (1966) (statute idringed right to enter library
to petition for end to segregated library system); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 US.
229 (1963) (statute infringed right to enter state house grounds to express grievances).
But see Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1%6) (state's interest in controlling jailyard
p r o p e q was sufficient to uphold convictions of demonstrators); Cox v. Louisiana, 379
U.S. 559 (1965) (activities near court house may be limited in deference to judicial
integrity).
71See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963) (only compelling state interest can
justify limiting first amendment freedoms).
72Even if no first amendment right of access exists, the handicapped individual may
be denied equal protection of the laws if the state creates an unreasonable classification
between the disabled and the non-disabled without a rational relationship to some state
interest. See note 23 m r a and accompanying text.
7sCost estimates by the National League oi Cities based on seven hypothetical buildings indicate that the additional cost involved in making them barrier free would be less
than one-half of one percent. See NATIONAL
COMMISSION
ON ARCHI~C~URAL
BARRIERS,
DESIGNFORALL AMERICANS
7 (1967). Studies based on three buildings actually constructed indicated that the cost was increased by only one-tenth of 'one percknt. See id.
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choice of construction7Qhe state has infringed the rights of the handicapped without countervailing state interest. Therefore the state has a
duty to eliminate all such impediments to the free exercise by the handie
such as ramps and railings, may
capped of their r i g h t ~ . ~ q o mchanges,
be effected at minimal financial outlay;76 others may involve expensive
structural changes. T h e courts, however, will order costly protections
~
the handicapped
when Bill of Rights freedoms are i n ~ o l v e d ? Thus,
individual may have a remedy against either the state or the federal
government for violation of his first amendment rights.

PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT

Only a small percentage of the estimated 14 million physically
handicapped Americans who could work if given the opportunity
actually are empl0yed.7~T h e handicapped individual's unemployment
74See United States v. ~ a i n &362
, u.s.-17, 25 (1960) (requirement of state action met
when source is person or agency formally identifiable).
75 Cf.Brown v. Board of Educ, 349 US. 294, 300 (1955) (remedies to constitutional
infringement must be enforced). A court might find that the state's duty to provide
access could be fulfilled by means other than barrier removal, such as providing agents
to assist the handicapped individual in securing services he otherwise might be unable
to obtain. While this may be an administratively logical solution, it does not seem to
be fully within the meaning o i the constitutional imperative that there be no infringement.
~ ~ N A ~ OCOMMISSION
NAL
ON ARCHITECTURAL
BARRIERS,
sIIpra note 73, at 3.
77See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (abolished poll tax);
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel at trial); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (right to counsel on appeal). See also Note, Discri?)zEnntions
Against the Poor nnd the Fourteenth Amendnzent, 81 HARV.
L. REV. 435, 440-41 (1967)
(financial interests of the state).
78118 CONG.REc. 1472 (1972) (remarks of Senator Williams). One study showed
that 25 percent of the unemployed handicapped respondents had tried but were unable
to find jobs. See AD. Little Co, Employment, Transportation and the Handicapped,
July 1968, at 30 (U.S. Social and Rehabitation Serv., Dept. of Health, Education, and
Welfare, No. c-69492).
Among the more severely handicapped, however, fully a third of those surveyed were
unable t o obtain employment. Id. at 31. The rate of employment for the entire sample
was 50 percent, varying from a high of 75 percent for individuals with back and spine
problems to a low of 29 percent for amputees. Id. at 29-30.
In addition to private employment, sheltered workshops funded by the state vocational agencies provide training and work for some handicapped individuals. These
workshops are partially exempt from the minimum wage requirements of the Fair
Labor Standards Act. See 29 U.S.C. S 214(d) (1970). Encouraged as a necessary alternative for the disabled, the workshops are criticized for providing inadequate wages
and facilities. See Handicapped Henrings-Sennte 1016-47. See also H.R. REP. NO.
92-1135, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 43 (1972). Additional jobs are provided under the Randolph-Sheppard Act of 1936 which grants blind people licenses and initial financial
aid for the operation of vending stands. 20 U.S.C. 1 107 (1970); see H.R. REP. NO.
92-1135, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 49-55 (1972). These jobs may be limited by the increasing
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naturally impairs his ability to support a family and to participate fully
in the daily activities of society. Some, unable to rely on family
support or other resources, are forced to accept welfare.7g
Although transportation and physical barriers play significant role3
in restricting employment possibilitie~,~~
a crucial factor is employer
attitude. In addition to stereotyped prejudices,sl many employers fear
that the handicapped person will be unable to perform assigned taskss2
This attitude exists despite the results of numerous studies showing that
the handicapped worker, when assigned an appropriate position, performs as well as, or better than, his non-handicapped co- worker^.^"
In spite of reassurances by insurance associations, many employers
also fear that workmen's compensation rates will increase due to employment of the disabled.84 However, employment of the handicapped
does not affect the premium rates either for non-occupational benefit
Furthermore, 46 states have
plans or for workmen's compensati~n.~~
second-injury laws which afford the employer some protection against
bearing the full cost of support if a disabled employee is reinjured and
permanently disabled.8G Nevertheless, employer prejudice against the
handicapped as an insurance liability remains.
use of automatic vending machines. Id. at 52. Encouragement to enterprises hiring the
blind is also provided by the Wagner-O'Day Act which authorizes special purchases
by federal agencies of blind-produced supplies. See 41 U.S.C. §§ 46-48 (Supp. 1971).
70 It is estimated that rehabilitation by federally financed state vocational rehabilitation agencies of 51,084 handicapped persons saved over $40.5 million in public assistance
payments. H.R. REP. NO. 92-1135,92d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1972).
sosee Handicapped Hearings-Sennte 515, 534-35; A.D. Little Co., supra note 78,
at 30; notes 43-45 supra and accompanying text.
81 One study showed that all d&abled-goups were subject to prejudice and that personnel directors would prefer to hire a former prison inmate or mental hospital patient
than an epileptic. See Richard, Triandis & Patterson, Indices of Employer Prejudice
Towmd Disabled Applicants, 47 JOURNAL
OF APPLIEDPSYCHOLOGY
52 (1963). See also
M. Gandy, supra note 2.
s2See US. BUREAU
OF LABOR
STANDARDS,
DEP'T O F LABOR,
BULL.hTO. 234, WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION
AND THE PHYSICALLY HANDICAPPED
WORRER
5, 20 (1961).
. 83See id. at 6-8.
84 The Association of Casualty and Surety Companies pointed out that rates are based
solely on the relative hazards in the company's work and the company's accident experience. Id. at 45. Statistics show that a company actually might minimize their accident
experience by hiring the disabled since they have eight percent fewer accidents than
their co-workers. See Handicapped Hearings-Senate 539.
85 U.S. BUREAUOF LABOR
STANDARDS,
supra note 82, at 10.
sosee Handicapped Hearings-Senate 535. Although many of these laws are limited
in the types of injuries covered and the amount of liability, some states are attempting
to strengthen the laws. Id. at 536. See also Hearings on H.R. 8395, H.R. 9847 and
Related Bills Before the Select Subconnn. on Education of the Hmse C o r n . on Edw
cation and Labor, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 113 (1972) (hereinafter cited as Handicapped
Hearings-House) ;US. EMPLOYMENT
STANDARDS
ADMINI~~O
DEP'T
N , OF LABOR,
BULL.
No: 212 (1971).
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Present governmental efforts promote voluntary action by employerss7
and encourage placement activitieP but do not aid persons refused
employment because of handicaps.89 Other groups, especially blacks,
also face serious discrimination in hiring by private employers. Gradually barriers are being overcome and jobs are being opened to qualified persons without regard to race. Progress has been achieved by
litigation based either on recentOO or on Civil War eraD1 legislation.
There may be some hope for similar progress through the courts for
the handicapped.
The primary federal law prohibiting discrimination by private employers, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964:' clearly does not proscribe discrimination against the handicapped?" However, a 1968 Suinvolving racial
preme Court decision, Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer e~.:~
discrimination, may provide a possible avenue of relief. The Court held
that Section 1982 of title 42 of the United States Code,OGa relatively
obscure statute originally derived from the Civil Rights Act of 1866,0O
applies to private racial discrimination in the sale of h0using.0~In refuting the general belief that state action was
the Court
87The President's Committee on Employment of the Handicapped works with indus-

try to gain acceptance of the handicapped worker and sponsors a National Employ the
Handicapped Week to publicize its efforts. See Handicapped Hearings-Senate 540,
1036-37. Each state has a Governor's Council on Employment of the Handicapped which
works closely with the President's Committee. In addition there are over 1,000 local
committees. Id. at 539.
8s In accordance with a 1971 Presidential directive, the vocational rehabilitation agencies, in conjunction with the United States Employment Service and the Veterans Administration, are placing special emphasis on training and job placement of Vietnam
veterans. See Handicapped Hearings-Senate 25456.
89 Only a few states have laws which prohibit private employment discrimination.
See, e.g, ILL.ANN. STAT.ch. 38, § 13-2 (Smith-Hurd 1972); IOWACODEANN. 5 601A.7
(Supp. 1972);WIS.STAT.ANN. § 111.31 (Supp. 1973).
90 See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970).
glSee Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, § 16,42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970); note 99 infm.
Q242 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970).
9gTide VII makes i t an unlawful employment practice to discriminate against any
person because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin. Id. 9 2000e-2 (a) (1970).
Efforts have been made to expand it to include the handicapped without success. See
notes 8-10 supra and accompanying text. Even if efforts t o include the handicapped in
Title VII are successful, n o Title VII remedy exists against employers of less than 25
workers. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (b) (1970).
94 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
95 42 U.S.C. 0 1982 (1970).
96Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1,14 Stat. 27.
97 392 U.S. at 420.
9sSee id. at 409,419-20,436. Prior to Jones it generally had been assumed that section
1982 required state action. See Larson, The Develo@mm of Section 1981 As R Rmredy
for ~ a c i a lscrimha hat ion, 7 HARV.
CN. RIGHTS-CN.LIB. L. REV.56, 57 (1972); 35 BROOK.
L. REV. 275, 276-77 (1969). But see United States v. Morris, 125 F.2d 322 (ED. Arlt.
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indicated that a companion statute, Section 1981,99 is applicable to
private discrimination in empl0yment.1~~
The J o m s Court examined the legislators' intent in enacting the 1866
Act and the thirteenth amendment, the latter stating that "[nleither
slavery nor involuntary servitude . . . shall exist within the United
States . . . ."lol An enabling clause grants Congress the power to
The Jones Court
enforce the amendment by appropriate legislati~n?~~
considered the amendment to have both a negative aspect-the abolition
of slavery-and an implicit positive corollary-the establishment of universal freedom?Or While specifically declining to decide whether the
amendment itself did any more than establish universal freedom,lo4the
Court held that Congress, under the enabling clause, had the power to
decide what acts constituted "badges and incidents of slavery" and
1903) (section one of Civil Rights Act of 1866, predecessor of section 1982, prohibits
private acts of discrimination aimed at preventing blacks from buying land).
9DThe statute provides that "All persons . . shall have the same right
. to the
fbll and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens
." 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970).
Both sections 1981 and 1982 are derived from section one of the Civil Rights Act of
1866. 392 US. at 422 11.28. The current United States Code notes that Section 1982 is
derived from the 1866 Act but attributes section 1981 only to the 1870 statute which
reenacted the 1866 Act after the fourteenth amendment was passed. However, section
1981 retains the scope of the 1866 statute. See Note, Racial D i s c ~ h t i o nIn Employment Under the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 36 U. CHI.L. REV.615, 619 (1969).
looThe Court, in a lengthy footnote, specifically overruled an earlier decision which
held that section 1981 required state action in employment discrimination. 392 U.S. at
441 n.78, merrztling Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1 (1906). A lower court was
prompt in seizing upon the language in J o m to prohibit discrimination by private employers on racial grounds. See Dobbins v. Local 212, IBEW, 292 F. Supp. 413 (SD.
Ohio 1968). T o date five circuits have agreed. See Bradley v. Bristol-Myers, Inc., 459
F2d 621 (8th Ci. 1972) (racial discrimination in hiring practices); Brown v. Gaston
County Dyeing Mach. Co., 457 F.2d 1377 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 982 (1972)
(racial discrimination in promotion policies); Young v. International Telephone & Telegraph Co, 438 F2d 757 (3d Ci. 1971) (racial discrimination by both employer and
union); Sanders v. Dobbs Houses, Inc., 431 F.2d 1097 (5th Ci. 1970), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 948 (1971) (refusal to rehire based on race); Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works,
427 F.2d 476 (7th Ci.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 911 (1970) (racial discrimination in hiring
practices).
One court has questioned whether section 1981 is in fact derived from the 1866 Act.
See Cook v. Advertiser, 323 F. Supp. 1212 (MD. Ala. 1971), aff'd om other g r o d s ,
458 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir. 1972). The discrepancies on which the Cook court based its
opinion may be due to the mistake of, a codiier in compiling and revising the statutes.
See Note, Section 1981 and Private Discrimination, 40 GEO.WASH.
L. REV.1024, 103639 (1972). See generally Larson, supra note 98, at 56.
101 US. CONS. amend. XIII; see 392 U.S. at 42244.
lo2See US. CONS. amend. XIII, S 2.
103392 U.S. at 439; see Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 241 (1911); Hodges v. United
States, 203 U.S. 1, 17 (1906); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883).
104 392 U.S. at 439.

.
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thus could be prohibited.lo5 Although the Court indicated that Jones
is applicable only to race,lo6some commentators suggest that the rationThus, it is posale of Jones applies to other forms of discri~nination?~~
sible to construct an argument asserting that the thirteenth amendment
and the subsequent Civil Rights Act of 1866 prohibit employment dis-l
crirnination against the handicapped.
In passing the thirteenth amendment the primary consideration hi
the minds of the legislators was Negro slavery in the South?08 HOWever, in drafting the amendment the legislators recognized that it would
make fundamental changes in the federal system and would enable
Congress to establish laws insuring equality for all citizens?OD By enact-;
ing section one of the 1866 Act, Congress extended to "citizens of
every race and color" the same rights to purchase and contract as those
enjoyed by "white persons." 11° Section 1981, derived from section
one, is even broader-encompassing not only citizens but "all persons"
within the United States.ll1 T h e debates at the time of enactment indicate that the legislators did not intend to limit the protection of the
Act to blacks.l12 Both sides in the controversy stated that the Act
applied to all persons?13 T h e legislators intended to prevent any group
from being held in an inferior status by ensuring that only one level
of citizenship existed throughout the land.
105 Id. By passing the 1866 Act, Congress indicated that it considered discrimination
in both the rights to purchase and the right to contract a "badge" or 'Tncident". Id. at
441. In an early decision the Court refused t o regard private denial of public accommodations as a "badge or incident of slavery" under the thirteenth amendment since it
had nothing to do with slavery or involuntary servitude. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S.
3, 24 (1883). I t viewed badges and incidents as those burdens and disabilities on fundamental rights, such as the right t o contract and t o purchase property, imposed by
slavery. Id. at 22. Both employment discrimination and the housing discrimination prohibited in Jones fall within the earlier Court's definition.
106 392 U.S. at 413.
lo7See Note, Jones v. Mayer: The Thirteenth Amendnzent and the Federal AntiDiscriini~mtionLaws, 69 COLUM.L. REV.1019, 1026-27 (1969); 20 CASEW. RES. L. REV.
448,457-59 (1969).
108 The thirteenth amendment was one of a series of post-Civil War enactments
aimed at terminating the last signs of slavery and ensuring freedom. It was preceded by
the wartime Emancipation Proclamation and passed to insure that document's post-war
validity. See 1 STATUTORY
HISTORY
OF THE UNITED
STATES: CIVILRIGITS13 (B. Schwartz
ed. 1970).
109 See J. TENBROEK,
EQUALUNDERLAW157-73 (1965).
110 Act of April 9,1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27.
111See 42 U.S.C. 5 1981 (1970) ;note 99 srcpra.
ll2See J. TENBROEK,
supra note 109, at 179; CONG.GLOBE,
39th Cong., 1st Sess. 438
(1866).
ll3See United States v. Classic, 313 U.S.299, 327 (1941); CONG.GLOBE,
39th Cong.,
1st Sess. 599,601 (1866).
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Due to its language and its history, section 1981 has been applied
to prohibit both racia1114and non-raciaP15 discrimination. If the intent
of the framers was indeed to secure universal freedom and to establish
equality, then "white citizens," must be interpreted broadly. This
standard was selected at a time when, compared with other groups,
whites did enjoy superior rights and was intended to indicate the highest form of personal liberty and freedom. The purpose and intent of
the framers of the statutory provision, therefore, requires that the law
not be limited to racial discrimination or to n ~ n - w h i t e s . ~ ~ ~
114Cenaal Presbyterian Church v. Black Liberation Front, 303 F. Supp. 894 (ED.
Mo. 1969); Gannon v. Action, 303 F. Supp. 1240 (ED. Mo. 1969), modified on other
grolmds, 450 F l d 127 (8th Cir. 1971). The courts in Central Presbyterian C k c h and
G m o n held, in effect, that when blacks invaded a white church, whites were denied
the rights of "white citizens." Comra Perkings v. Banster, 190 F. Supp. 98, a f d , 285
F l d 426 (4th Cir. 1960) (section 1981 jurisdiction not available to white claiming false
arrest). See also Dombrowski v. Dowling, 459 F.2d 190, 199 n.24 (7th Cir. 1972) (court
suggests without deciding that section 1981 may not apply to white w h was denied
office rental because associates were blacks); Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th
Cu. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972) (section 1981 prohibits employment discrimination based on race, whether it is against blacks or whites; court however viewed
section 1981 as based on fourteenth amendment); 23 VAND.
L. REV. 413 (1970) ( dISCUSsion, of ~ m m a n ) .
.
.
11Qee Scher v. Board of Educ., 424 ~ 2 741,743
d
(3d Cir. 1970) (per curiam) (sections
1981 and 1983 do not apply exclusively to racial or religious discrimination; available to
boy denied equal protection by arbitrary expulsion from school). Conha Schetter v.
Heim, 300 F. Supp. 1070, 1073 (ED. Wisc. 1969). But cf. Georgia v. Rachel, 384 US.
780,791-92 (1966) (legislative history of Civil Rights Act of 1866 shows intent r d c t e d
to racial equality).
The Court also has upheld anti-peonage statutes based on the thirteenth amendment
regardless of the race of the defendant. See Clyatt'v. United States; 197 US. 207, 218
(1905). Section 1981 was enacted to enforce the thirteenth amendment and applies to all
races and colors. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 US. 60, 78 (1917). However, the Court in
BIlchanan appeared to place some weight on the reenactment of section 1981's -predecessor, the Civil Rights Act of 1866, afser the fourteenth amendment became effective.
Id. at 74-76. Two other cases which hold that section 1981 applies to all races and
colors appear to rely at least in part on the fourteenth amendment rationale. See
Takahashi v. Fish Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 419 (1948) (section 1981 rests in part on the
fourteenth amendment); United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 695-96 (1898)
(acknowledges section 1981's thirteenth amendment basis but uses fourteenth amendment rationale). However, in a recent case involving denial of welfare benefits to resident aliens the Supreme Court indicated that section 1981 was .separate from. the
fourteenth amendment. See Graham v.. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (state statute
violated fourteenth amendment as well as federal power to regulate aliens as carried
out by section 1981). Moreover, the Jones Court stated that reenactment of the 1866 Act
after the fourteenth amendment did not affect the scope of the Act. See Jones V.
Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 436 (1968).
lleIt has been suggested that limiting the protection of the Act to blacks offends
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. See, Note, The "New" Thirteenth A71zend'11zem:A Prelinzinnry Analysis, 82 .HARV.
. L. REV. 1294, 1315-16 (1969); 20
CASEW. RES.L. REV.448,459 n.75 (1969).
'
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The Jones Court, while calling segregated housing patterns a "relic"
of slavery,l17 applied the term to practices which could be traced only
indirectly to the institution of slavery itself.l18 Thus the expression
should not be used to limit a "badge or incident" to those employment
practices which existed during the period of slavery. If by "relic" the
Court meant the discrimination which the black man faces, not because
of his former servitude, but because of his current second-class status
'in society,l19 then that same discrimination is suffered by the handicapped who are isolated and set apart from the mainstream of society.lZ0
It cannot be said that the handicapped are treated as first class citizens
enjoying all of the rights of "white persons." The handicapped, therefore, should be protected by both the thirteenth amendment and section
1981.Such a view of the amendment and its purpose is consistent with the
intention of its 'framers to secure universal freedom.121 Even if the
,framers comprehended no other discrimination than racial, the Constitution is not an inflexible document, frozen by the attitudes and con'ditions which prevailed at the time of its passage.122 Rather, the Con. stitution is a living institution, adaptable to the circumstances of modern
society and responsive to the ideal of true equality for all people. Since
the courts must determine the significance of constitutional principles
by considering their growth as well as their origin,128their interpretation of the Constitution can be responsive to the changing social and
economic values of the nation.124 The evil which the thirteenth
-

117 392 U.S. at 442-43.
118The Court viewed

racial ghettoes which are a development of the 20th century as

a "relic" of slavery. Id. But see Casper, Jones v. Mayer: Clio, B m e d and Confused

Mzse, 1968 S. CT. REV.89 (description of housing segregation during Civil War).
11gWhile some of the discriminatory racial practices existing today may have been
- i n existence at the time of slavery they appear to be based less on former servitude and
more on unreasoning prejudice which causes some whites to view blacks as inferior.
See 392 U.S. at 446 (Douglas, J., concurring).
l2oSee Lassen, Voice of the Militant Cripple, EVENT(Aug. 1969) (published by the
President's Committee on Employment of the Handicapped). The isolation may stem
in large part from discrimination by employers and school systems. See notes 12-16,
78-86 supra and accompanying text.
121See note 103 supra and accompanying text.
122See United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 316 (1941); Wright v. United States,
302 U.S. 583, 607 (1938). The Constitution is a starting point for developing legal
reasoning rather than an aggregate of hard and fast precepts to be handed on and followed from generation to generation. See Stone, The Cumwon Lnw in the United
Sfutes, 50 HARV.L. REV.4,23 (1936).
l23See Gompers v. United States, 233 U.S. 604, 610 (1914) (Holmes, J.).
124See Note, supra note 116, at 1302-03. The lawmakers couched the amendment in
terms general enough to encompass the total institution of slavery as it developed,
responding fully to the evil perceived. Id. at 1302. As modern perception of that evil

Heinonline

61 Geo. L. J.

1518 19721973

amendment originally sought to eradicate was the inherent injustice of
maintaining a class of people in a position of inferiority. An interpretation of the amendment which includes all persons who suffer from
such inferiority, even if not the specific intent of the framers, would
be within the spirit of their enactment?25
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT

While federal agencies are prohibited by law from discriminating
against an individual because of a physical
few states have
similar statutes. Moreover, the courts have given scant attention to
whether a state agency is prohibited from refusing to hire an otherwise
qualified person purely on the basis of a physical handicap,.127 The
Supreme. Court consistently has recognized that the fourteenth amend-,
ment, while granting the states power to treat classes of people in dif-'
ferent ways,12*does deny them the power to discriminate on the basis
of irrelevant criteria.129 Thus the Court, although never acknowledging
grows, the response may assume an increasingly broader scope. Id. By rejecting an
overly narrow interpretation of the amendment it may be more readily adapted to the
"evils" of today's society. Id. at 1302-13.
125See G
&
v. ~ r e c k e n r i d ~ 403
e , U.S. 88, 97 (1971) (accords early civil rights
statutes a sweep as broad as their language). However, Griffin indicated that the thirteenth amendment is closely related to slavery. See id. at 105. In another decision the
Couq dismissed an argument that a city's action t o close its pools rather than to integrate them was a badge or incident of, slavery. Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217
(1971). The Court noted that although the enabling clause of the amendment might
allow the passage of legislation t o control pool closings, Congress had. not chosen t o pass
such a statute. Id. at 227.
126See 5 U.S.C. 5 7153 (1970). Only one action has been brought under this statute.
See Kletzing v. Young, 210 F2d 729 (D.C. Ci.1954) (suit by blind man t o be r e h t e d
on Civil Service employment register; brought under section 7153's predecessor; dismissed as moot since register had expired).
The Vocational Rehabilitation Act of. 1972 contained a section prohibiting discrimination in federally funded programs. See H.R. 8395, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. 5 601 (1972).
The Act was vetoed by the President. Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents,
Oct. 30, 1972.
127See King-Smith v. Aaron, 455 F2d 378 (3d Cir. 1972), redg 317 F. Supp. 164
(W.D. Pa. 1970). The Third Circuit, in reversing the abstention-dismissal by the district court, remanded the plaintiffs fourteenth amendment and section 1983 claims and
asserted that these claims enjoyed jurisdiction which the federal court had a duty t o
consider. Id. at 381; see 42 U.S.C. 5 1983 (1970).
128 See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 446-47 (1970), citing Reed v. Reed, 404
U.S. 71, 75-76 (1971); Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949);
Barbier v. Connally, 113 U.S. 27 (1885).
See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 446-55 (1972) (statute barring sale of
contraceptives distinguished between married and unmarried individuals); Reed v.
Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-76 (1971) (statute gave preference t o men in granting letters of
estate administration); Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457. 465-66 (1957) (licensing statute
exempted one corporation); Armstead v. Starkville Municipal Separate School Dist.,
'
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the existence of a right to public employment,130 has held that a person
constitutionally is protected by the fourteenth amendment from arbitrary employment discrimination by the state.131
If a handicapped individual alleges facts which indicate arbitrary
employment discrimination, action may be maintained under section
1983 of title 42 of the United States Code.132 Since the action of an
agency through its officials is state action within the meaning of the
statute, the claim is c0gnizab1e.l~~The complainant of course must
be prepared to prove that the denial of employment was due to discrimination and not to a lack of proper qualifications.
325 F. Supp. 560, 569 (N.D. Miss. 1971), modified, 461 F2d 276 (5th Ci.1972) (racial
discrimination in hiring and retaining public school teachers); accord, Chambers v. Hendersonville City Bd. of Educ, 364 F.2d 189, 192 (4th Cir. 1%6) (en banc). See also
note 23 m p a and accompanying text.
130For many years government employment and government services have been
regarded as privileges, not rights, and thus unprotected by rules of, substantive due
process. However, such distinctions have been so eroded that the concept remains of
doubtful validity. See generally Alstyne, The Demise o f the Right-Privilege Distinctim
&z c o n r t i t u t i o ~ lLaw,81 HARV.L. REV. 1439 (1968).
131See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605-06 (1967); Wieman v. UpdegmE, 344 US. 183, 191-92 (1952). An individual is also constitutionally protected from
einployment discrimination by the, federal government. See Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm'n v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 372 US. 714, 721 (1963) (racially discrirninatory federal W i g regulation would violate the fifth amendment); United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 100 (1947) (Congress could not enact regulation providing
that no Republican, Jew or Negro could be appointed to federal office). See also
Comment, Aliens and the Civil Service: A Closed Door?, 61 GEO.L.J. 207, 215-18 (1972)
(federal discrimination and the fifth amendment).
Even if a handicapped individual has a valid claim, he faces, however, the general
reluctance of the coum to oversee federal agencies' hiring practices. See Comment,
Racial Discrimination in the Federal Civil Service, 38 GEO. WASH.L. REV. 265, 280
(1969); Comment, Aliens and the Civil Service: A Closed Door?, 61 GEO. L.J. 207,
216-17 (1972).
13242 US.C. 5 1983 (1970). Section 1983 requires two elements: the party must have
been deprived of rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States; and
the deprivation must have been under the color of state law. Adickes v. S.H. ICress &
CO., 398 US. 144 (1970).
.
Section 1983 was originally section one of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 which was
enacted to enforce the provisions of the fourteenth amendment. Mitchum v. Foster,
407 US. 225, 238 (1972); see Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, 5 1, 17 Stat. 13, as m)zended,
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). Section one was modeled on section nvo oE the Civil Rights
Act of 1866. 407 U.S. at 238; see Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, 5 2, 14 Stat. 27.
133The legislative debates surrounding passage of section 1983's predecessor indicate
that the discriminatory state action may be executive, legislative or judicial. Mitchum
v: Foster, 407 U?S. 225, 238 (1972); Ex pmte Virginia, 100 US. 339, 346-47 (1879). Even
an abuse of authority is coyered by section 1983. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167,
172 (1961); United States v. Classic, 313 US. 325, 326 (1941).
~ b w e v e r ,the federal government and the District of Columbia are not states within
the meaning of the statute. District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 419 (1973).
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If an action ismaintainable under either section 1983 or the fourteenth
amendment
the handicapped person may have recourse against
a number of employers, depending upon their relationship with the
state. Under a broad interpretation an action should be maintainable
against all public agencies as well as private organizations sipdicantly
controlled by the state.135 The handicapped individual must select the
defendant carefully since municipalities may be immune from suit
under section 1983.136 However, recovery has been allow.ed against
134An action for denial of equal protection of the laws may be maintained under the
fourteenth amendment alone. See, e.g, Grifiin v. County School Bd, 377 U.S. 218,
232-33 (1964); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Staub v.
City of Baxley, 355 US. 313 (1958). One court has held that an action not cognizable
under section 1983 against a c k t y could be maintained against the same defendant
under the fourteenth amendment. See Shelbourne Inc. v. New Castle County, 293 F.
Supp. 237, 245-46 (D. Del. 1968). C m a , Whimer v. Davis, 410 F2d 24 (9th Cir. 1969).
The requirements for state action are the same under section 1983 and the fourteenth
amendment. United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 n.7 (1966).
Discrimination in transportation systems has been successfully labelled state action.
See Kissinger v. New York City Transit Authority, 274 F. Supp. 438 (S.D.N.Y. 1967);
note 54 supra and accompanying text.
Actions of hospitals, too, have come under judicial scrutiny. See McCabe v. Nassau
County Medical Center, 453 F.2d 698 (2d Ci.1971). In McCabe the court held that
since the hospital was a public institution, the plaintiff need not point to specific state
statutes compelling them to act as they did in order to meet the "under color of state
law" requirement of section 1983. Id. at 703-04. It is the source of the defendant's
authority, not only the laws that purport to justify the action, which determine whether
the defendant has acted under color of law. Id. at 704. Whether or not the state's role
in regulating private hospitals would be sufficient to make their actions "state action"
has been considered by several lower courts. The majority seem to have concluded
that due to the states' role in disbursement of funds under the Hill-Burton Act private
discrimination is state action. See S i n s v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 323 F2d
959- (4th Cir. 1963) lexcellent discussion of Hill-Burton; racial discrimination); Holmes
v. Silver Cross Hosp, 340 F. Supp. 125 (N.D. 111. 1972) (violation of religious belief);
Sams v. Ohio Valley General Hosp. Ass'n, 257 F. Supp. 369 (N.D.W. Va. 1966) (&crimination against out-of-state physicians); Hill-Burton Act § 622(f), 42 U.S.C. §
211 (e) (f) (1970). But see Place v. Shepherd, 446 F.2d 1239 (6th Ci.1971) (receipt of
state or federal funds did not transform private hospitals into public institutions). The
couk in Place indicated, however, that there might be a 'cause of action if a public
hospital refused to hire. Id. at 1246.
1SBSee Monroe v. Pape, 365 US. 167, 191 n.50 (1961) (Chicago not "p'erson" under
statute). The decision has caused considerable confusion in the circuits, and some c o r n
either have interpreted the Court's statements narrowly or have considered Momoe
overruled sub silentio by later opinions which failed to consider whether the entity sued
was proper under section 1983. Other courts have distinguished between actions for
damages, such as Monroe, and those for equitable relief, or have ignored Momoe
completely. See Johnson v. Cincinnati, 450 F.2d 796 (6th Cir. 1971) (ignored Monroe);
Harkless v. Sweeney Independent School Dist., 427 F.2d 319 (5th Ci.1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 991 (1971) (restricted Monroe to its facts and granted equitable relief
under section 1983); Schnell v. City of Chicago, 407 F.2d 1084, 1086 (7th Ci.1969)
(Monroe limited to money damages) ;Local 858, Am. Fed'n of Teachers v. School Dist.
No. 1, 314 F. Supp. 1069,1073 (D.Colo. 1970) (Monroe rendered irrelevant by Supreme
Court cases ignoring it); Note, Civil R i ~ h t s S c h o o lOficials' Not Persons For Purposes
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entities such as school boards137 and state universities.la8 Even if an
immunity exists, the plaintiff may sue the state employee who deprived
him of his rights in the employee's individual capacity.laD Thus, the
handicapped may have a potent means of redress for public employment
discrimination.

Although concern for the plight of the handicapped may be increasing, they still face serious obstacles in their effort to achieve equal
treatment by society. While many areas merit attention, education, physical access, and employment are among the most significant. Although
there has been little litigation involving the rights of the disabled, possibilities for redress do exist. By carefully selecting strong cases in
which the right denied is extremely important, and the discrimination
and damage are evident, the handicapped may be able to achieve some
success through the courts. However, the theories discussed herein are
only suggestions for legal action; they are largely unexplored and do
not preclude the development of other strategies.
It is nonetheless imperative for the handicapped to continue to focus
efforts on Congress and the state legislatures. Legislation ensuring the
rights of the handicapped would be the most uniform and far reaching
solution to the problems presented. The inclusion of the handicapped
among those protected by the Civil Rights Act of 1964140 is the most
desirable solution on the federal level. Such an amendment would allow
the handicapped access to the Act's complaint mechanisms and to the
o f Sectim 1983 Regardless of Relief Sought, 24 S.WL.J. 360, 362-64 (1970) (discussion
of cases in which the appropriateness of the entity sued was ignored).
Moreover, one court held that whiie a police department was not a person for purposes of section 1983, a suit for denial of equal protection could be maintained under
section 1981. See United States ex rel. Washington v. Chester County Police Dep't, 294
F. Supp. 1157 (E.D. Pa. 1969), a f d an rehearing, 300 F. Supp. 1279 (ED. Pa. 1970).
See generally Thornberry, Suing Public Entities Under the Federal Civil Rights Act:
Monroe v. Pape Rec-dered,
43 U. COLO.L. REV.
105, 108-17 (1971) ;Note, Developing
Govenmzentnl Liability Under 42 U.S.C. 5 1983, 55 MINN. L. REV. 1201 (1971); 24
VAND.L. REV.1252 (1971).
137 See, e.g, Walton v. Nashville Special School Dist., 401 F.2d 137 (8th Cir. 1968);
Rolfe v. County Bd. of Educ, 391 F.2d 77 (6th Ck. 1968); Wall v. Stanley County
Bd. of Educ, 378 F.2d 275 (4th Ck. 1967).
138See Brown v. Strickler, 422 F2d 1000 (6th Cir. 1970) (no discussion of M m o e ) .
Contra, &tun v. Rector, 309 F. Supp. 184 (E.D. Va. 1970) (relies on M m o e ) .
139See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 187, 192 (1961). Suits against the individual, however, may have a limited effect on the public agencies' policies and mav produce little
in the way 05 monetary recovery. See Note, Developing G o v m e n t a l Liability Under
42 U.S.C. 5 1983, 55 MINN. L. REV. 1201, 1209 (1971) (discussing recovery against
policemen).
140 42 U.S.C. f 2OOOe (1970).
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expertise of its enforcement offices. T h e enactment of legislation will
not, however, be the end of the struggle. Rather, it will be the beginning of a process which eventually must ensure that every handicapped
individual has an even start with the rest of society.
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